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Five paintings in all: each small painting, completed by the artist Robert Priseman in oils and 
ornamentally framed, depicts a landscape. Perhaps, to utter the generic term “landscape” here is 
almost too much in this context, calling to mind, for instance, the haunting expansive works of 
Caspar David Friedrich or the more socialized paintings of John Constable. Instead, two of the 
paintings present us with small streams—one of these, designated S, appears to be a wooded area, 
while U offers a view of the banks but provides no further visual information; the two paintings 
entitled M and A are road scenes set amid trees, thus suggesting that the environs to be that of the 
countryside rather than the town; finally, somewhat separate from the rest is C, which shows two 
trees shorn of their leafs—indicating a wintery time of year—silhouetted against an orange sky. All 
five paintings, then, are, at first glance, indefinite regarding their location. Their smallness and 
concentration upon small details, moreover, seemingly restricts their narrative dimension, as does 
the absence of people. If anything, they resemble details—or indeed, fragments—of a larger, more 
encompassing landscape painting or series of landscape paintings, rather than landscape paintings in 
themselves.   
 If the paintings are coy about revealing their specific locale (or if they even have one), the 
single letters that comprise their titles is more forthcoming. Read in the correct order, the letters 
spell out SUMAC, which serves as the collective noun of this series, and references a police 
investigation—Operation Sumac—carried out over half a decade ago. In late 2006, a series of 
murders were perpetrated in the county of Suffolk. The five victims were young women, all of 
whom were working as prostitutes in the area, a fact which, for some, served as sufficient 
justification for drawing their deaths as a “natural corollary” (albeit tragic) of their dangerous, 
illegal occupations. The ensuring police investigation uncovered a local taxi driver and former 
merchant navel sailor, Steve Wright, as the murderer. The victims died as the result of asphyxiation 
and their bodies were left naked (there was no evidence of sexual molestation, however), leading to 
Wright becoming dubbed “The Suffolk Strangler) in the rural locations now depicted in Priseman’s 
paintings.   
 Insofar as these miniatures depicting landscapes relate to the brutal murders perpetrated by 
Steve Wright, then we are compelled to ask whether such an aesthetic strategy is adequate to the 
trauma it represents through a specific act of pictorial displacement. Staging the critical question, 
however, in terms of adequacy is surely insufficient—doing so risks making the decisive issue 
merely a technical or formal matter. Rather, there are further questions that demand to be brought to 
  
the fore: questions of the particular responsibilities that should be borne by the artist in the face of 
the wanton murder of others and of the representability of trauma tout court. Thus, then, not only or 
simply a question of “is this the most appropriate way to document a tragic series of events?” but 
also “should the artist engage in these kinds of issues?” and “is it possible to represent trauma at 
all?” (responding that artists have often freely sought to engage such weighty subjects is not 
evidence that they should or, more pertinently, that they can).    
 The artistic strategy under discussion here is less common within painting. Rather, the field 
of photography has been much more commonly associated with traumatic representation—whether 
we are speaking of collective or personal trauma—than painting has. On this score we can’t 
sidestep the massive influence of Walter Benjamin’s “Little History of Photography” and Roland 
Barthes Camera Lucida upon theories of trauma within photographic discourse. These texts have 
been repeatedly and extensively analysed, but it bears mentioning in this context Benjamin’s 
famous commentary upon the Dauthendey portrait photograph in which he writes: “No matter how 
artful the photographer, no matter how carefully posed the subject, the beholder feels an irresistible 
urge to search a picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of the here and now, with which reality 
has (so to speak) seared the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that 
long-forgotten moment the future nests so eloquently that we, looking back, may rediscover it.” 
i
Similarly projecting future death as something implicit but determinative within the photograph, 
Barthes argued that these frozen images contained a temporality marked my mortality. As he 
famously wrote, the photograph of the manacled Lewis Payne—awaiting execution for his 
attempted murder of  W. H. Seward, the US Secretary of State in 1865—evinces a peculiar 
conjunction with time and mortality: “He is dead and he is going to die” Rather than seeing this 
conjunction as distinct to this image alone, Barthes comments that it is shared by all photographs: 
“In front of the photograph of my mother as a child, I tell myself: she is going to die: I shudder, like 
Winnicott's psychotic patient, over a catastrophe which has already occurred. Whether or not the 
subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe.”ii 
 Photography’s peculiar historicity, its indexical connection to a particular time and place, 
combined with the sheer contingency and transitoriness of that time and place, allows it to become a 
medium that is indelibly traumatic. In his book Spectral Evidence, Ulrich Baer examines two 
photographs taken by two different photographers. Both Sobibór (1995) by Dirk Reinartz from his 
photo-book Deathly Still: Pictures of Former Concentration Camps and an untitled image from 
Mikael Levin’s War Story (1997) which depict markedly similar scenes: overgrown clearings, 
completely unpopulated with no extant architecture, plain overcast skies rendered starkly in black 
and white.
iii
 That these two photographs show former concentration camp locations isn’t 
immediately obvious. Instead, their usage of landscape pictorial traditions and the lack of visual 
  
clues displace their documentary evidence. Although knowing here might rely upon contextual 
historicist awareness—that is to say, an extra-visual knowledge—Baer’s interest stems from 
perceiving the power of these works as emanating from an altogether source. For Baer, their 
evidentiary power coincides not with contextual reconstruction but from the very absence of visual 
historical markers. At stake here isn’t the “banality of evil” as metaphorically replicated by the 
quotidian ordinariness of the landscape in the photographs; rather, it is the emptiness of the 
landscape, its refusal to represent, that testifies to the sheer unrepresentability of the Holocaust. 
Thus, that which evades representation and the negation of representation becomes paradoxically 
the most adequate representation of historical trauma.  
 While the correspondences between these photographs and Priseman’s SUMAC paintings 
are plain, various factors disclose that we shouldn’t erase their specific differences without further 
analysis. Firstly, there is a question of medium. For Benjamin, Barthes, and Baer, the traumatic 
kernel is the outcome of qualities peculiar to the photographic medium even though they 
foreground different temporalities (so that Benjamin and Barthes project the future trauma from the 
present of the photograph, whereas Baer uncovers the historical trauma from the present).  It would 
appear on that basis, then, that painting doesn’t possess the same intrinsic relation to the traumatic 
event. Secondly, there is an awkward question of the scale of tragedy: can we straightforwardly 
equate the millions that were brutalized and executed in the Nazi camps with the deaths of five 
women at the hands of one killer? To ask such questions of Priseman’s SUMAC isn’t to do these 
works a disservice by demanding a near-impossible historical and ethical standard. On the contrary, 
it might be argued that Priseman’s oeuvre has regularly compelled such questions as we can tell 
from his various suites of pictures such as No Human Way to Kill (2007-2008) and his Holocaust-
addressing Nazi Gas Chambers: From Memory to History (2008-2009).  
 And indeed, through looking at these other paintings we quickly notice how concerned 
Priseman is to generate typologies of space. Eschewing any self-consciously expressive brushwork, 
Priseman seems both to depict spaces in a manner that refuses traces of subjectivity as a means of 
highlighting the objectivity of quasi-photographic visual qualities in his painting, on the one hand, 
and to allow himself to be drawn to spaces that possess some degree of psychical disturbance. 
Taken together, the two aspects reveal a dynamic of “witnessing” in Priseman’s paintings that seeks 
to uncover the invisible stain of trauma. But if we are to speak of witnessing, then we must 
necessarily ask who is the witness here and what responsibility of testimony befalls them. 
Presenting us with views of rural Suffolk, the obvious art-historical predecessor to SUMAC would 
be the paintings of John Constable. To that extent, we might assume that part of Priseman’s 
fascination with these crime scenes resides within the perversion of what is locally known as 
“Constable Country” which proposes a rather different twist to what John Barrell referred to as “the 
  
dark side of the landscape” vis-a-vis the rural scenes depicted by Constable, Thomas Gainsborough, 
and George Morland.
iv
 It is as if Constable’s pictures are now haunted by the murders to happen 
later on. Yet while Barrell illuminated the plight of the rural poor in these paintings, thereby 
establishing their evidentiary status, to my mind we need to look across the channel for a body of 
work that corresponds more proximately with the model of witnessing that I’m suggesting is 
present in Priseman’s oeuvre in general and SUMAC in particular. That is to say, we must turn to 
the example of Caspar David Friedrich.  
 As Joseph Leo Koerner argues in his perceptive study of Friedrich, the significance of his 
paintings relates to the recurrent thematization of looking and experiential cognition that 
underscored his pictorialized Romanticism. Unlike Constable, arguably, Friedrich is less directly 
concerned with mimetically recreating through paint the landscape than he is with recording his 
experience of the landscape, especially that experience when confronted with specific sensory limit 
conditions answerable to Immanuel Kant’s formulation of the sublime. Such thematic treatment of 
looking is evident through the frequent presence of single figures and very small groups of people 
in the foreground of the canvas. Nearly always seen from behind, the Rückenfigur (the name given 
to Friedrich’s turned away figures) is explicitly gazing at the scene before him or her. But if the 
people depicted in Friedrich’s paintings stage looking, then it’s important to remark that they 
actively prefigure the act of looking the viewer carries out in beholding the painting. With their 
backs turned towards us, they look more or less at the same sublime landscape as we do. Their 
concentrated act of looking that we “see-in” thus becomes an invitation for us, as beholders of the 
painting and the world itself, to contemplate our own acts of looking. Referring to Friedrich’s The 
Monk by the Sea, Koerner writes concerning the Rückenfigur of the monk: “[the monk] does not 
explain or mediate the picture’s meaning, but only repeats the picture’s essential deferment of 
meaning; or that he emblematizes the subject of landscape as the subject in landscape; or that he is a 
mirror of myself, who is at once forced and unable to constitute the picture’s true subject.”v  
 We might contend, then, that Friedrich’s paintings and the manner that they thematize 
subjective experience serves as an historical analogue of Priseman’s paintings and his call to 
witnessing. And indeed, these two artists complement one another suitably: Friedrich apprehends 
within the genre of landscape after Kant’s revolution in philosophy the necessity of dealing with the 
near unrepresentablilty of the sublime, whilst Priseman apprehends within the genre of landscape 
after the Holocaust and the necessity of the near unrepresentability of traumatic historical 
experience. The proposed comparison with Friedrich’s paintings, however, may ring as somewhat 
misleading. After all, there is no Rückenfigur here for us to synchronize our looking with. 
Moreover, if the boundlessness of the sublime was the ultimate test of experience for the 
Romantics, then the partial views offered by SUMAC point in a very different direction. Instead of 
  
the immensity of earth and sky, the mountains breathtakingly shrouded in mist, or the sea 
transformed into sheets of ice, Priseman offers us a view of a stream seen as if from too close a 
distance. There are hints of Friedrich in SUMAC, but the transition from Friedrich to Priseman is 
tantamount to a transition from the landscape to the detail.  
 But this is very much to the point. The small scale of the SUMAC pieces engenders a very 
different relationship to the beholder not just by setting aside notions of the sublime that are 
prevalent in Romanticism and in landscape painting more generally but also use that smallness to 
draw the beholder physically closer to each canvas. While our tendency is to initially step back 
from a Friedrich painting in order to encompass it within our field of vision, the deliberate 
smallness of Priseman’s SUMAC compels the viewer to reduce their distance between themselves 
and the painting so as to inspect them with the care required. To that extent, our inspection surely 
resembles on some level the exceptionally close scrutiny carried out by the police and forensic 
teams after the discovery of each victim. Seeing from close-up, we are effectively searching for the 
telltale traces of murder even if the bodies or signs of the Wright’s presence—footprints, broken 
twigs, for example—are not present within the landscape scene. The smallness of each painting, 
moreover, means that they could potentially be held in the hand, brought close to the eyes, turned 
this way and that, thereby facilitating an extremely high degree of forensic examination. And 
therefore, we find our own looking thematized, albeit in manner very different to that of Friedrich, 
and to very different ends. There are no subjects in Priseman’s SUMAC landscapes, but we are 
nonetheless the subject of those landscapes.   
 That would perhaps be a good place to end if it weren’t for the ethically problematic issue of 
seeing ourselves as the subjects of Priseman’s SUMAC. Surely, we might worry, it is the victims—
Tania Nicol, Gemma Adams, Anneli Alderton, Annette Nicholls, and Paula Clennell—that are the 
subjects of these Suffolk landscapes, not us. And worse, is there not the danger that in 
comprehending ourselves as the subjects of those landscapes we deny the victims’ personal 
histories, their tragic fates, thus metaphorically killing them a second time? But this would be, to 
my mind, to misconstrue our role in this. Through becoming the subject of these landscapes we do 
not replace the subjecthood of the victims, rather we are called forth as witnesses of their deaths, to 
remember when the physical traces have eroded and memory has faded. And if our ethical 
responsibility as beholders is one of empathy for the victims that has been triggered by how 
Priseman thematizes looking and witnessing of a trauma that is not represented—that cannot be 
represented—through documentary evidence, then the stake of these paintings as landscape 
paintings is rather different from what we normally expect. As I have contended, despite their 
geographical proximity to “Constable Country,” it is the works of Friedrich rather than Constable 
that provide the more accurate predecessor to Priseman’s enterprise within the landscape tradition 
  
insofar as Friedrich’s landscapes correspondingly emphasize the constitutive role of experience, 
thereby consequentially rendering his landscape paintings studies of subjectivity. And yet, it seems 
possible to make a stronger although potentially counterintuitive claim. Out of all the genres within 
the history of art it is portraiture that is most commonly taken to emblematize subjectivity. Given 
that, as we have seen, Priseman problematizes mimetic representation, it strikes me that we can 
plausibly argue that SUMAC is not simply a series of landscape paintings that thematize witnessing. 
On the contrary, they are non-mimetic portraits of the five victims, and, as portraits, we are 
enjoined to become witnesses of those victims as person to person.    
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